Abstract Standard possible world semantics for propositional modal lan-guages ignore truth-value gaps. However, simple considerations suggest that it should not be so. In Section 1, I identify what I take to be a correct truth-clause for necessity under the assumption that some possible worlds are incomplete (i.e., "at" which some propositions lack a truthvalue). In Section 2, I build a world semantics, the semantics of TV-models, for standard modal propositional languages, which agrees with the truth-clause for necessity previously identi-fied. Sections 3-5 are devoted to systematic concerns. In particular, in Section 4, Prior's system Q (propositional version) is given a TV-models semantics and proved adequate (i.e., sound and complete) with respect to it.
1 Incomplete worlds and modality Let a proposition be any statement that is actually true or false, 1 and let us say that possible world w is (i) complete with respect to proposition p if and only if p is true or false at w, and (ii) complete (tout court) if and only if it is complete with respect to all propositions. Then by definition the actual world is complete. And a classical assumption in possible worlds semantics for propositional modal logics is that every possible world is complete.
There are serious reasons to reject that assumption. Consider, for instance, the proposition 'Socrates is mortal', and assume (i) that there are possible worlds where Socrates does not exist, and (ii) that for 'Socrates is mortal' to have a truth-value at a world, Socrates must exist therein: two defendable assumptions, which jointly entail that there are worlds where 'Socrates is mortal' has no truth-value.
Once it is granted that some propositions have no truth-value at some worlds, it is still not decided if and how these truth-value gaps are transmitted to more complex propositions. In this paper, we shall adopt the principle of contamination, according to which if a proposition has no truth-value at a given world, then every proposition containing the first thereby has no truth-value at that world. Now, the admission of incomplete worlds, together with the acceptance of the principle of contamination, raises some difficulties when it comes to stating truthclauses for necessity operators. Consider first the usual clause: (1) A is true iff A is true at every possible world. Now, let w be a possible world, incomplete with respect to some proposition A. Then, by the principle of contamination, w is also incomplete with respect to A∨ ∼A. And since, of course, being true at a world entails having a truth-value at that world, a consequence of (1) is that A∨ ∼A is not necessarily true: an unhappy result. The classical modal logician has a ready-made solution to this problem. It consists in adopting the spirit, not the letter, of the classical truth-clause for the box: (2) A is true iff A is true at every complete world.
The problem with this proposal is that, as far as I can see, there is no good reason to accept the restriction to complete worlds. For consider some proposition A. Then intuitively, if A is necessarily true, then A is true at every world where it has a truthvalue-and not only at every complete world. And conversely, if A is true at every world where it has a truth-value, then, plausibly, A is necessarily true. (Note here that if A is true at every world where it has a truth-value, it is true at every complete world, and so by the classical clause, it is necessarily true.) That is, intuitively the following biconditional holds:
A is true iff A is true at every possible world where it has a truth-value.
Let us now turn to possibility. Defining possibility in terms of necessity by the usual ' =∼ ∼', the following truth-clauses can be derived from (1), (2) , and (3) respectively:
(1 ) A is true iff there is a possible world at which A is not false; (2 ) A is true iff there is a complete possible world at which A is true; (3 ) A is true iff there is a possible world at which A is true.
(The derivations make use of the basic truth-condition for ∼ , the fact that being true at a world entails having a truth-value at that world, and the principle that having a truth-value at world w and not being true at w entails being false at w.) Condition (1 ) is subject to the same type of problem as (1) . For let w be a possible world, incomplete with respect to some proposition A. Then, by the principle of contamination, w is also incomplete with respect to A & ∼ A. And once again, since being false at a world entails having a truth-value at that world, a consequence of (1 ) In Section 2 below, I build a simple world semantics for standard languages containing a necessity operator which agrees on necessity with condition (3). Systematic matters and adequacy results are dealt with in Sections 3-5.
2 Modeling necessity Let L be a formal language, whose vocabulary consists in (i) a denumerable set of propositional letters (the atoms), and (ii) the operators ∼ (negation), & (conjunction), and (necessity). What counts as a formula of L is characterized in the usual way, and operators ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ (material implication), ≡ (material equivalence), and (possibility) are standardly defined.
There are many ways one can provide L with a world semantics which agrees with condition (3) of Section 1. However, the most straightforward way to model L is by means of what I shall call TV-models. TV-models are essentially S5-models without accessibility relation, modified so as to take into account the possibility of truth-value gaps. More precisely, a TV-model for language L is a quadruple @, W ,TV, |= , where W is a set, @ is in W , and TV and |= are two-place relations between worlds and atoms, meeting conditions:
for every atom p, TV(@, p), and [|=-TV] for every w in W and every atom p, if w |= p then TV(w, p).
Under the intended interpretation, W is the set of all possible worlds, @ is the actual world, 'TV(w, p)' is read ' p has a truth-value at w', and 'w |= p' is read ' p is true at w'. The first condition amounts to the claim that the atoms of L stand for propositions in the sense introduced at the beginning of Section 1 and the second condition speaks for itself.
Given an arbitrary TV-model @, W ,TV,|= , we must specify how TV and |= The idea behind these three conditions is that (i) a complex formula has no truth-value at a world if some of its subformulas have no truth-value at that world, and (ii) a complex formula has a truth-value at a world if its subformulas all have a truth-value at that world. (i) is motivated by the principle of contamination and (ii) seems reasonable.
The clauses for |= are
For an arbitrary TV-model we then have
The clauses for ∼ and & are standard and the condition for is as foreshadowed. We also have, for every world w and every formula A,
Let us turn finally to validity. Formula A will be said to be valid in TV-model M if and only if for every world w of M at which A has a truth-value, A is true at w. And formula A will be said to be valid if and only if A is valid in every TV-model.
As one can easily check, all L-instances of axiom (schema) T ( A ⊃ A) and axiom E ( A ⊃
A) are valid, and the rule necessitation ( A/ A) is validity-
are not valid. In fact, let p and q be two atoms.
q is false at the actual world of any TV-model @, {w, @},TV, |= where p and q are both true at @, p has no truth-value at w and q is false at w. The logics to be presented below, in particular Prior's Q, diverge from system S5 essentially in that each contains as a theorem a modified version of axiom K. (Here it should be noted that while some L-instances of axiom K are not valid, every instance of
) has all its instances valid.) 2 3 System S5 > The first system I shall envisage is S5 > . Like the systems to be defined in Section 4, it is formulated in a language richer than L.
S5 > and its semantics
The language for S5 > is L > -that is, L with extra twoplace operator >. We define the TV-models for L > in the same way as the TV-models for L, and the semantical clauses for the new operator are given by Validity is defined as before. For an arbitrary TV-model, we have
Thus, ' A > B' is to be read as 'at every world where A has a truth-value, B has a truthvalue', or as 'for A to have a truth-value B must also have a truth-value'. ' A > B' can be seen as expressing the idea that there is some kind of relevance link between A and B or between the "information" conveyed by A and by B. System S5 > is defined by the following axioms (schemas) and rules.
Classical axioms
Every PC-valid L-formula 
4. w |= p iff w |= p for every atom p and every w in W such that w = w 0 or p
By the definition of N, for every atom p in B and for every w in W ,
From this fact, it follows that given any formula C whose atoms are all in B, for every 
Proof:
. . , C n be all the atoms in C. If each is in B, then by the first axiom for >,
By the transitivity of >, it follows that A > B ⊃ A > C. 3. By the previous result. 4. Let B 1 , . . . , B n be all the atoms in B. By Proposition 3.1(3),
By necessitation then,
, and (c) yield the result. 6. By classical logic and necessitation,
We then have the result by Proposition 3.1(1). 7.
. The result follows from axioms E and T.
Now for the completeness proof, let α be a nontheorem, and let @ be a maximal consistent extension of {∼α} (use a Lindenbaum-type construction to prove the existence of @). (I use a standard definition of consistency and inconsistency: a set of formulas is inconsistent with respect to a given system if and only if there is a finite collection A 1 , . . . , A n of members of such that ¬( A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n ) is a theorem of that system; and is consistent with respect to a given system if and only if it is not inconsistent with respect to that system.)
Proposition 3.2 Every theorem is in @, and for all formulas A and B, if A
This proposition will be used without explicit mention. Its proof is standard.
Let At be the set of all atoms, and let χ (constituency) be the function from the set of all formulas to P (At ) such that χ( A) is the set of all atoms in A.
Let X be a nonempty subset of At. Then the closure of X, cX, is
Note that for X and Y any subsets of At, X ⊆ cX, ccX = cX, and if X ⊆ Y then cX ⊆ cY. A nonempty subset X of At will be said to be closed if and only if X = cX.
Proposition 3.3 For all formulas A and B, A > B ∈ @ if and only if χ(B) ⊆ cχ( A).
Proof: Let A and B be formulas, let χ( A) be { A 1 , . . . , A n }, and let χ(B) be {B 1 , . . . , B m }.
So by definition of closure, B j ∈ cχ( A).
Conversely, suppose that B j ∈ cχ( A). By definition of closure, there are 
if and only if χ(B) ⊆ cχ( A).
Where X is a closed set of atoms, let @[X] be the set of all formulas A such that A ∈ @ and χ( A) ⊆ X. Note that @[X] is never empty (by definition, a closed set is never empty, and if X contains, say p, then @[X] contains p∨ ∼p). Also note that by axiom T, @[X] ⊆ @ for every closed set of atoms X. As a consequence, each @[X] is consistent.
For every set of formulas S and every closed set of atoms X, say that S is Xmaximal in case (i) for every A in S, χ( A) ⊆ X and (ii) for every formula A such that χ( A) ⊆ X, either A ∈ S or ∼ A ∈ S. Clearly, every consistent set of formulas satisfying (i) , in particular every @[X], has some X-maximal consistent extension (adapt the usual Lindenbaum-type construction).
Let W be {w|w is an X-maximal consistent extension of @[X] for some closed set of atoms X}. Note that @ is in W , since At is closed and @ is trivially an Atmaximal extension of @ [At] . For every w in W , there is only one closed set of atoms X such that w is an X-maximal consistent extension of @ [X] . Call it 'D(w)'. In the other direction, for every closed set of atoms X, there is some world w such that D(w) = X. The reason is that @[X] is never empty. Now, where p is any atom, put 'TV(w, p)' for ' p ∈ D(w)', and 'w |= p' for ' p ∈ w'. We have, for every atom p and every w in W , 1. TV(@, p) (since D(@) = At), and 2. if w |= p then TV(w, p) (by maximality).
The 4-tuple @, W ,TV, |= is then a TV-model. The aim is now to prove that for every formula A and every world w, w |= A if and only if A ∈ w, which will give us completeness.
Proposition 3.4 Let w be in W . Then 1. every theorem A such that χ( A) ⊆ D(w) is in w, and for all formulas A and B, if A ∈ w and ( A ⊃ B) ∈ w then B ∈ w; 2. for all formulas A and B, if χ( A) ⊆ D(w) and A > B ∈ @ then χ(B) ⊆ D(w).
Proof: The proof for (1) is quite standard. For (2), let A, B be formulas.
Suppose that χ( A) ⊆ D(w). Then cχ( A) ⊆ cD(w), and since D(w) is closed, cχ( A) ⊆ D(w). Now suppose that A > B ∈ @. By Proposition 3.3, it follows that χ(B) ⊆ cχ( A). So, χ(B) ⊆ D(w).

Proposition 3.5 For every w in W and for every formula A, A ∈ w if and only if A ∈ @ and χ( A) ⊆ D(w).
Proof: Let A be a formula.
Suppose A ∈ @. Then by Proposition 3.1(6),
A ∈ @. So, for every w in
, and consequently A ∈ w.
2. Suppose A / ∈ @. By maximality, ∼ A ∈ @. So by axiom E, ∼ A ∈ @.
Consequently, for every
Thus, ∼ A ∈ w, and so by consistency, A / ∈ w.
Proposition 3.6 For every w in W and for all formulas A and B, 1. ∼A ∈ w if and only if χ( A) ⊆ D(w) and A / ∈ w; 2. A & B ∈ w if and only if A ∈ w and B ∈ w;
A > B ∈ w if and only if χ( A) ∪ χ(B) ⊆ D(w) and for every v in W such that χ( A) ⊆ D(v), χ(B) ⊆ D(v).
Proof: Let A and B be formulas and let w be in W . 
We have then by Propo-
Then by maximality, ∼ ( A > B) ∈ w. By Propositions 3.1(5) and 3.4(1), it follows that ∼ ( A > B) ∈ w. So, by Proposition 3.5 and axiom T ∼ ( A > B) ∈ @, and as a consequence, A > B / ∈ @. By Proposition 3.
3, then, χ(B) is not a subset of cχ( A). Let v be any world with D(v) = cχ( A). We have: χ( A) but not χ(B) is a subset of D(v).
Proposition 3.7 For every w in W and for every formula A, A ∈ w if and only if χ( A) ⊆ D(w) and for every
Proof: Let A be a formula and let w be in W .
Suppose A ∈ w. A first consequence is that χ( A) ⊆ D(w).
A second consequence is that A ∈ @ by Proposition 3.5. From this it follows that for every
We have then the following: a. B 1 , . . . , B n are in @, and so by Proposition 3.1(7), (
These three points plus axiom K > entail that A is in @. So, since by hypothesis A is not in @, we must conclude that 
Proposition 3.8 For every formula A and every world w, TV(w, A) if and only if χ( A) ⊆ D(w).
Proof: Easy.
Proposition 3.9 For every formula A and every world w, w |= A if and only if A ∈ w.
Proof: By induction on the length of the formulas, using Propositions 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. This ends the completeness proof.
4 System Q 3 Prior was aware that the possibility that a proposition has no truthvalue at some possible world has to be taken into account in a correct treatment of propositional modal logic. Accordingly, he developed a system, Q, and gave some indications as to how to provide it with a world semantics (see Prior and Fine [1], . These indications show that, essentially, Prior agrees with the TVmodeling of necessity presented in Section 2. In the present section, two results are achieved. First, it is shown that system Q can be seen as a fragment of a mild extension of system S5 > . Second, Q is given a TV-model semantics and proved adequate with respect to it.
4.1 System Q Prior formulates system Q in a language with primitive operators ∼, & , , and S-where S is a one-place operator intended to express necessary statability (a proposition is necessarily statable if and only if it is statable (i.e., has a truth-value) at every possible world). 4 For the sake of uniformity, I will rather formulate Q in language L S , namely, L augmented by operator S.
System Q can then be defined thus, with standing for ∼ ∼ as before (see [1] , pp. 84-85).
Classical axioms
Every PC-valid formula 
Semantics for Q and adequacy
We can do better: we can prove that system Q is adequate with respect to the obvious TV-model semantics for language L S . The TV-models for L S are defined in the same way as the TV-models for L, and the semantic clauses for operator S are 1. TV(w, S A) iff TV(w, A), and 2. w |= S A iff for every w in W , TV(w, A).
As is easily checked, Q is sound with respect to the semantics of TV-models for L S .
For completeness, a slight adaptation of the completeness proof of Section 3 gives the result. The proof for Q is even a bit simpler. Propositions 3.1(6) and 3.1(7) hold in the present context, and we have the following proposition.
From axioms E and T, it follows that ∼ S A ⊃∼ S A. Hence the result.
Let α be a nontheorem and let @ be a maximal consistent extension of {∼ α}. Proposition 3.2 still holds.
Let At be now the set of all atoms of L S . Function χ is defined as before. Let S(At ) be the set of all atoms p of L S such that S p is in @. Where X is a nonempty subset of At, the closure of X, cX, is now X ∪ S (At ) . As before, a subset X of At will be said to be closed if and only if X = cX.
Where X is a closed set of atoms, @[X] and X-maximality are defined as in Section 3. As before, each @[X] is consistent and has some X-maximal consistent extension.
We finally define the TV-model @, W ,TV, |= as in Section 3, and the aim is to prove now that for every formula A and every world w, w |= A if and only if A ∈ w. These three points plus axiom K S entail that A is in @. So, since by hypothesis A is not in @, we must conclude that {∼ A} ∪ @[cχ( A)] is consistent. The rest of the proof is as in Section 3.
Proposition 3.8 still holds. We conclude that for every formula A and every world w, w |= A if and only if A ∈ w, as expected.
5 A simpler system All the systems considered so far are formulated in a language richer than the purely modal language L. But consider system S5 − , whose rules are modus ponens and necessitation and whose axiom schemas are all PC-tautologies, T, E, and
where all the atoms of A are in B. 5
Clearly, K − is a theorem of Q and S5 > (and of S5 >t ). So, S5 − is sound with respect to the class of all TV-models for L. Moreover, completeness is easily proved (adapt the completeness proof for S5 > by defining the closure of a nonempty set as that very set; every proposition in the completeness proof for S5 > which does not concern operator > is provable as it stands). 
